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1. INTRODUCTION
Many claims about concept learning in
animals rely on binary categorization
tasks (Herrnstein et al., 1976; Freedman
et al., 2001; Marsh and MacDonald, 2008).
When subjects exceed chance levels of per-
formance, they are alleged to have learned
“the concept.” Critics are quick to point
out that although subjects have learned
something, confounds may explain per-
formance more simply (Katz et al., 2007;
Wright and Lickteig, 2010; Zentall et al.,
2014). Despite a growing literature on
both sides, supporters of “concept learning
in animals” seem no closer to persuading
the skeptics, while skeptics are no closer
to persuading proponents. This rift hinges
on disagreements over the strength of the
evidence.
Results from dichotomous classifica-
tion procedures represent the weakest pos-
sible evidence for concepts in animals, for
reasons unrelated to the validity of cor-
responding theoretical claims. One pitfall
is the tailor-made classifier, which may
arise during training. Effectively, “teach-
ing to the test” undermines claims about
animals’ general knowledge. Another is the
lucky guess during testing. A simplistic
response during the testing phase will yield
many rewards due to guessing alone, mak-
ing it difficult to assess the precise content
of learning. These shortcomings are inde-
pendent, such that either might confound
an experiment.
1.1. THE TAILOR-MADE CLASSIFIER
The risk of animal subjects “outsmart-
ing” their minders has been with us since
Clever Hans. Whatever the aims of our
experimental paradigms, the influence of
extraneous information must be mini-
mized so that results reflect the intended
empirical test.
Concept learning presents the scrupu-
lous researcher with a challenge: How does
one identify (much less control for) the
extraneous features of a stimulus? Our
understanding of how the brain catego-
rizes stimuli remains limited (Freedman
and Assad, 2011), but there is also no con-
sensus about what constitutes a feature.
The list of stimulus attributes that might
be used to categorize stimuli includes
overall descriptive statistics (“presence of
the color green”), low-level structural
details (“T-shaped edge junctions”), pat-
terning (“presence/absence of tiled fea-
tures”), functional interpretation (“looks
like food”), ecological indicators (“bright
color = poison”), and interacting levels
of analysis (cf. Spalding and Ross, 2000;
Marsh and MacDonald, 2008). As such,
the content of learning is subject to mul-
tiple interpretations.
A classifier is an algorithm (however
simple or complex) that matches a stim-
ulus with a discrete category. In gen-
eral, classifiers must undergo training to
become sensitive to category-relevant fea-
tures. Any classifier is limited in what it
can detect, and some begin with innate
knowledge (such as instincts that some
stimuli are threatening). These character-
istics hold both for computer algorithms
and for the processes used by organisms to
classify stimuli. The aim of studying how
organisms solve problems of this kind is to
discover and describe their classifiers, and
to distinguish processes that have evolved
recently from those that are well-preserved
across many species.
Herein lies the problem: When train-
ing requires that only two categories be
identified, then the classifier (and there-
fore the organism) need only identify
some difference that distinguishes them,
and nothing more. The result is a tailor-
made classifier: Tailored by the specifics of
the binary training paradigm, and opti-
mized solely for that dichotomous dis-
crimination. Just as a bespoke suit is tai-
lored upon request to fit a single person,
a tailor-made classifier is only effective at
the discrimination it was trained for. At
its most extreme, this is Clever Hans in a
nutshell: A (cognitively) cheap trick that
yields rewards but falls short of generalized
knowledge.
When faced with this problem,
researchers often narrow the scope of
the features available. A set of images
might have colors removed, luminances
matched, occluders introduced, and noise
added (e.g., Basile and Hampton, 2013).
Such studies are valuable because they
help reveal which features can be used
by the classifier. However, regularized
stimuli cannot rule a tailor-made classi-
fier, because so many potential “features”
might provide the basis for the clas-
sification. Furthermore, insofar as the
resulting stimuli are “unnatural,” they
generalize poorly to how stimuli are cat-
egorized in ecological contexts. So long
as any feature is consistent enough across
stimuli to permit classification, there is a
possibility that the classifier relies exclu-
sively on that feature. To be sure that the
classifier used by an organism is capable of
generalized knowledge, it is essential that
training encompass more than a single
dichotomous categorization.
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1.2. THE LUCKY GUESS
Independent of the classifier (tailor-made
or otherwise), the clarity of the evidence
depends on how learning is eventu-
ally tested. If subjects make dichotomous
choices (e.g., “face” vs. “house,” or “same”
vs. “different”), then a naive animal will
be rewarded half the time. If the positions
of the stimuli are counterbalanced (and
they usually are, to prevent bias), then
this naive animal needn’t even randomize
its responses; uniformly and insensitively
choosing “left” yields a steady stream of
rewards.
If a subject’s classifier functions even
modestly, this rate of reward can be
exceeded. However, it is difficult to assess
what proportion of correct responses are
genuine classifications and what propor-
tion are merely lucky guesses. Accuracy
of 70% on a binary test could mean
that the subject is guessing at random
more than half the time (e.g., 40% cor-
rect classifications, 30% lucky guesses,
30% unlucky guesses). If a 50% reward
rate is deemed satisfactory to the sub-
ject, then responding quickly and mind-
lessly may prove the most favorable
strategy. High guessing rates undermine
the researcher’s ability to make general
statements about stimulus properties, par-
ticularly given the difficulty in determin-
ing which characteristics are used by the
classifier.
Guessing is much less effective when
tests require more complex responses. If
a subject must take a set of n stimuli and
assign each to one of n categories, the odds
of guessing correctly drop as n increases.
This has two benefits. First, error rates
will provide an improved signal-to-noise
ratio in trying to evaluate the characteris-
tics of a subject’s classifier, effectively mak-
ing every correct sequence of responses
more informative. Second, the reward gra-
dient will be better correlated with accu-
racy: Poor performance will yield far fewer
rewards, providing an incentive to attend
to the task and to produce high-quality
responses.
2. A DEMONSTRATION BY
SIMULATION
These two confounding factors are rele-
vant regardless of the complexity of the
classifier. In education (as in machine
learning), teaching to the test yields
poor general learning and T/F exams
do not reliably measure depth of learn-
ing. We offer a concrete simulation using
the bag-of-features classifier (O’Hara and
Draper, 2011) provided in the Computer
Vision System toolbox for Matlab v2014b
(MathWorks, 2014). Despite relying on
low-level features, this approach performs
well with photographic stimuli. To rep-
resent a “cognitive limit,” we limited all
classifiers to no more than 100 clusters
of features. The Caltech-101 image bank
provided 9665 stimuli belonging to 102
categories (Fei-Fei et al., 2007). Half the
images were used to train the classifier, and
the other half were set aside as a novel
“validation set” for testing.
2.1. TRAINING A TAILOR-MADE CLASSIFIER
The 10 categories in the Caltech 101 with
the most images were ordered by size. The
classifier was trained and subsequently val-
idated using the first two of these cate-
gories, then the first three, and so forth up
to ten. Because the classifier was limited to
100 clusters, its criteria became more gen-
eral as the number of categories increased.
The accuracy for each category, as well as
the overall average, is plotted in Figure 1
(left).
Some image categories continue to per-
form well as additional categories are
added: Airplanes, leopards, and “easy”
faces were categorized correctly over 85%
of the time. However, other categories did
less well when the classifier was forced
to generalize. In particular, performance
for the category of “background images”
steadily deteriorated, presumably due to
the lack of consistent discrete features. If
this algorithm was being studied with only
three categories, however, this deficiency
would not be apparent: Backgrounds were
categorized correctly 90% of the time
when competing with only two other pos-
sible choices, in which case the algorithm
identifies them by process of elimination.
It is only when backgrounds compete with
many other stimuli that the algorithm
reveals its inability to handle abstraction.
2.2. MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF
GUESSING
We retrained the classifier using all 102 cat-
egories. The classifier was then tested as
FIGURE 1 | Performance of the bag-of-features classifier using 100
feature clusters. (Left) Classification accuracy given training on the 10
largest categories in the Caltech 101 sample set. Colored lines show accuracy
for specific categories, while dashed black lines show overall accuracy for
each level of training complexity. (Right) Accuracy by a classifier trained on
102 categories during a test in which n stimuli must be classified correctly for
a trial to be “correct.” Performance for the classifier’s 10 best (black) and
worst (white) categories was gauged. Solid lines indicate cases in which
classification was done perfectly, while dashed lines indicate cases where
correct responses required at least one guess.
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follows: For each trial, exactly one novel
image was drawn from each of n cate-
gories. The classifier had to match every
image with its corresponding category.
Responding randomly succeeds with a fre-
quency of 1n! . If classifiers judged multiple
images to belong to the same category,
one stimulus was randomly assigned to
the identified category, while the rest were
assigned to whichever categories remained
unaccounted for. For example, if pictures
of a bonsai and a forest were both iden-
tified as “bonsai” rather than as “bonsai”
and “background,” respectively, one of the
two pictures would be assigned to “bonsai”
and the other, by process of elimination,
would be assigned to “background.”
Figure 1 (right) shows performance for
the classifier’s 10 highest-performing cat-
egories (black) and ten lowest-performing
categories (white). Solid lines show the tri-
als in which every stimulus was correctly
identified without guessing, while dashed
lines show those trials that were correct
given at least one guess. Although there is
a clear distinction between high and low
performance, there is always a benefit for
guessing. In the two-item test, a poor clas-
sifier guessed its way to 72% accuracy, a
level that would be considered “high” in
many published studies. In four- and five-
category tests, most rewarded trials for the
poor classifiers involved some guessing.
There is a temptation to identify cor-
rect responses as indicative of mastery,
but even a poor classifier providing vague
hunches permits performance to exceed
chance. This ‘slightly-informed guessing’
is responsible for many correct responses
made by a poor classifier. The best defense
against guessing is to increase the com-
plexity of the test, which makes each trial
much more informative.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
Our simulation demonstrates perils of
narrow category training and of simplis-
tic tests. When a subject (or an algorithm)
is trained on only a handful of cate-
gories, learning may overspecialize, failing
to capture the classifier’s general apti-
tudes. Similarly, when even a highly gen-
eral classifier is tested on only a few
categories at a time, correct trials fre-
quently result from informed guessing
rather than from robust representation of
all extent categories. We demonstrate these
problems separately, but the two can eas-
ily act in concert. When a study displays
both confounds, it is nearly impossible
to judge whether performance arises from
any abstract understanding of the stimuli,
even when sophisticated post-hoc analysis
is employed.
The best defense against the possibility
of a tailor-made classifier is to increase the
number of categories that are trained in
parallel. Demonstrating that two-category
training transfers to novel stimuli from
those categories provides no protection
against this problem, since it is fundamen-
tally a problem of how training unfolded.
However, while clever tricks may permit
pictures of faces to be distinguished from
pictures of houses, such trickery is more
difficult given three categories, still more
difficult given four, and so on.
Many studies that trained more than
two categories (e.g., Herrnstein et al.,
1976; Sigala, 2009; Vonk, 2013) neverthe-
less tested only one or two stimuli at a
time. Others have required that subjects
match a stimulus to one of four cate-
gories (Bhatt et al., 1988; Lazareva et al.,
2004). Although an improvement, such
match-to-sample procedures reward ran-
dom responses on 1n trials, and informed
guessing remains an effective approach for
a poor classifier.
Contrary to the recommendations of
Katz et al. (2007), we recommend that
test conditions require subjects to iden-
tify more than one stimulus category
during each trial. Unfortunately, few val-
idated methods provide an appropriate
level of response complexity. One candi-
date is the simultaneous chain (Terrace,
2005), which has been used to test
serial and numerical cognition. In such
cases, subjects would need to choose n
simultaneously-presented items in a par-
ticular order, which requires that subjects
process and select from all categories at
once. Another candidate is the ALVIN pro-
cedure (Washburn and Gulledge, 1995).
This task, which requires subjects to imi-
tate a sequence in a manner similar to
‘Simon Says,’ could be adapted to test a
classifier by presenting a sequence using
one set of stimuli and requiring the imi-
tated sequence to be made using differ-
ent (but categorically consistent) stim-
uli. Recovering from the weaknesses of
prior concept studies will require that
researchers raise the bar, and give their
animal subjects the opportunity to succeed
(or fail) on their own cognitive merits.
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